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Abstract Since the famous debate between Russell (Mind 14: 479–493, 1905, Mind
66: 385–389, 1957) and Strawson (Mind 59: 320–344, 1950; Introduction to logical
theory, 1952; Theoria, 30: 96–118, 1964) linguistic intuitions about truth values have
been considered notoriously unreliable as a guide to the semantics of definite
descriptions. As a result, most existing semantic analyses of definites leave a large
number of intuitions unexplained. In this paper, I explore the nature of the relationship
between truth value intuitions and non-referring definites. Inspired by comments in
Strawson (Introduction to logical theory, 1964), I argue that given certain systematic
considerations, one can provide a structured explanation of conflicting intuitions.
I show that the intuitions of falsity, which proponents of a Russellian analysis often
appeal to, result from evaluating sentences in relation to specific questions in context.
This is shown by developing a method for predicting when sentences containing non-
referring definites elicit intuitions of falsity. My proposed analysis draws importantly
on Roberts (in: Yoon & Kathol (eds.) OSU working papers in Linguistics: vol. 49:
Papers in Semantics 1998; in: Horn & Ward (eds.) Handbook of pragmatics, 2004)
and recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of focus.
Keywords Truth value intuitions  Definites  Questions  Prosodic focus 
Topic  Presuppositions  Semantics  Pragmatics
In contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, two mutually incompatible
semantic analyses of definites are predominant. These are of course Russell’s (1905)
famous quantificational analysis and the presuppositional analysis as defended by
Strawson (1950, 1952, 1964).1 The focal point of disagreement between these
analyses is whether definites should be analyzed as asserting or merely presupposing
1 With the important precursors to the presuppositional analysis appearing in Frege (1892, 1918).
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the existence of an individual satisfying the relevant description. In the profusion of
spirited defenses of these analyses, appeals to truth value intuitions are fairly
common. For proponents of a Russellian analysis, the intuition of falsity elicited by
a sentence such as (1) is often considered an argument in favor of an existential
analysis—an analysis on which sentences containing non-denoting descriptions are
assigned a classical truth-value. In contrast, for proponents of a Strawsonian anal-
ysis, the fact that no clear truth value intuition is elicited by sentences such as (2) is
considered an argument in favor of a presuppositional analysis—an analysis on
which sentences containing non-denoting descriptions are undefined, viz. neither
true nor false.
(1) The king of France shot my cat last night. (Neale 1990)
(2) The king of France is bald. (Strawson 1964)
The immediate problem is that these variations in truth value intuitions are perva-
sive and as a result many researchers today maintain that (a) truth value intuitions
are too unstable to provide decisive support for either analysis, (b) that providing an
explanation of these pervasive variations is essentially intractable, and (c) that
appeals to truth value intuitions merit no serious attention. In other words, truth
value intuitions have acquired a bad reputation.2
But simply disregarding these putative semantic intuitions is not obviously fea-
sible. Both the existential and the presuppositional analyses provide uniform
treatments of no-reference cases, and as a result a wide variety of cases are left
unexplained on both analyses. This is unsatisfactory for several reasons, but one
particular reason is that an important factor in assessing the adequacy of a semantic
analysis is its predictive capabilities. Yet, given that both the existential and the
presuppositional analyses give uniform treatments of no-reference cases, the result
is numerous incorrect predictions.
One way to resolve the problem of apparently conflicting intuitions is to take the
existence of these fragile, highly context-sensitive, and frequently unstable intu-
itions as constituting a direct argument against both aforementioned analyses. This
option amounts to the claim that only a non-uniform analysis of definites, i.e. an
analysis which is capable of assigning both classical and non-classical truth values
to sentences containing non-referring definites, will be adequate, see e.g. Lasersohn
(1993). However, another option, available to both proponents of Russell’s theory
2 Occasionally, the problem is categorically dismissed. For instance, in his book Descriptions, Neale
(1990) writes.
[. . .] all sorts of factors may conspire to deter the native speaker from saying that a given
utterance is true or false, but that is hardly enough to show that the utterance lacks a
truth-value. (Neale 1990, p. 28)
While Neale is right that the existence of no-reference cases which elicits no robust intuitions is insuf-
ficient for concluding that a given sentence lacks a truth value, Neale neglects to consider which factors
might deter the native speaker from saying that a given utterance is neither true nor false. This paper is an
attempt to explore and explain why we should believe that such factors exists and what they are.
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and proponents of Strawson’s theory, is to combine the analyses with a systematic
explanation of the problematic cases, e.g. an explanation which justifies disre-
garding certain parts of the data. Such an approach would be successful if it was
effectively demonstrated that parts of the putative semantic data are semantically
irrelevant.
While investigating the behavior of truth value intuitions is in itself instructive,
this paper is an attempt to explore the second option. In particular, it’s is an
attempt to explain why truth value intuitions exhibit such extensive variations and
in turn evaluate to what extent a semantic analysis of definites can and should rely
on such intuitions. The aim is to show that in order to make sense of these
recalcitrant truth value intuitions, an alternative perspective on the putative data,
so far neglected in the debate, is required. The upshot of my analysis is that the
fairly commonplace intuitions of falsity associated with sentences containing non-
referring definites quite often result from factors which are not semantically rel-
evant. This yields, ceteris paribus, reasons to favor a presuppositional analysis of
definites.3
The hypothesis in this paper is that intuitions of falsity elicited from sentences
suffering from existential presupposition failure are a result of evaluating the
content of the sentences in relation to a contextually salient question. In particular,
I show that there is an important relation between robust intuitions of falsity and the
satisfaction of certain conversational conditions. I argue that the existence of this
relation puts into question whether these intuitions track the semantic status of the
sentences in question. The proposal here is essentially an attempt to revive and
systematize important insights made by Strawson (1964) while avoiding certain
problematic consequences of his proposed solution.
I begin the paper by briefly illustrating the complexity of the phenomenon to be
explained. The data shows quite vividly that there is no simple or obvious sys-
tematic pattern which provides an easy explanation of the variance in intuitions.
Next, I briefly discuss a couple of recent attempts to explain the behavior of truth
value intuitions, and argue that these proposals are problematic in various respects.
In light of these proposals, I contend that to gain a better understanding of the
behavior of truth value intuitions, we must first consider their behavior in context,
namely their sensitivity to discourse topics and to salient questions. Adopting
Roberts’ (1998, 2004) framework for discourses, I show how intuitions are sys-
tematically sensitive to context, and that there is an important connection between
intuitions of falsity and, what I label, conversational consonance. Subsequently,
I study what happens when non-referring definites interact with prosodic focusing.
The effects of prosodic focus are perplexing and a neglected phenomenon in recent
discussions of the problem. However, I show that the present proposal provides a
straightforward explanation of these effects. Finally, I evaluate the explanatory
adequacy of the proposal.
3 If your favored semantic analysis of presuppositions is couched in a dynamic framework, I’m here
advocating the view that non-referring definites, pace presupposition accommodation, incur update
crashes.
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1 The intuitive pull
First a bit of useful terminology: I use the abbreviation SWEPF for Sentences With
Existential Presupposition Failure. This is merely a choice of words and it’s inter-
changeable with e.g. sentences containing non-referring definites or similar. I use the
term robust truth value intuitions (or sometimes just robust intuitions), to refer to
intuitions of falsity or (in rare cases) intuitions of truth, however I focus almost
exclusively on cases which elicits robust intuitions of falsity. I use Strawson’s term
squeamish to refer to SWEPFs which elicit no robust intuitions, i.e. squeamish
SWEPFs. These are SWEPFs where one feels an immediate inability to judge the
sentence either true or false—i.e. the SWEPF elicits a feeling of squeamishness.
1.1 The data
The paradigm case of a SWEPF which elicits squeamishness is Strawson’s famous
example (2).
(2) The king of France is bald. (Strawson 1964)
An immediate inability to evaluate this sentence for truth or falsity is a common
reaction—the reaction that is normally reported in the literature. Confronted with
(2), there is an intuitive sense that the speaker has made a mistake and that one
cannot simply dismiss the sentence as false. In other words, it appears to elicit no
robust intuitions. However, a small tweak of the content in (2) seems to make
intuitions change.
(3) The king of France is a skinhead.
(4) The king of France is a bald nazi.
These SWEPFs differ from (2) in that they seem to elicit a much stronger sense of
falsity and there is thus a marked contrast between (2) and (3)–(4).
Let’s consider another contrast pair. The SWEPFs in (5) and (6) are standard
examples of SWEPFs which elicit robust intuitions of falsity. Assume that the
demonstratives below pick out contextually salient objects.
(5) The king of France is sitting in that chair. (Lasersohn 1993)
(6) The king of France owns that pen. (von Fintel 2004)
While these SWEPFs elicit robust intuitions of falsity, a change in intuition is again
facilitated by a seemingly insignificant change of the content, e.g. (7–8).
(7) The king of France is sitting in a chair.
(8) The king of France owns a pen. (von Fintel 2004)
586 A. J. Schoubye
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If these sentence do not elicit straightforward squeamishness, I think the pull to-
wards squeamishness is certainly non-negligable. If so, there is again a distinct
contrast between (5–6) and (7–8).
From the point of view of semantic analysis, the above SWEPFs seem to suffer
from the same defect, namely that the definite description fails to refer. One would
therefore prima facie expect our intuitions to be uniform, yet they are clearly not.
There are numerous contrast cases such as the above and below I provide a select
sample of relevant cases. Since the data is somewhat fine-grained, contrast cases are
particularly useful for demonstrating the peculiar variances in intuitions. What’s
important at this point is to consider the intuitive pull of the sentences. These
minimal pairs show how sentences which are structurally quite similar nevertheless
pull intuitions in different directions.4
# = Squeamishness F = Falsity
(2) # The king of France is bald.
(4) F The king of France is a bald nazi.
(7) # The king of France is sitting in a chair.
(5) F The king of France is sitting in that chair.
(8) # The king of France owns a pen.
(6) F The king of France owns that pen.
(9) # The king of France is on a state visit.
(10) F The king of France is on a state visit to Australia this week.
(11) # The king of France heard about Goldbach’s conjecture.
(12) F The king of France proved Goldbach’s conjecture.
SWEPFs ðSentences With Existential Presupposition FailureÞ
4 I adopt von Fintel’s (2004) convention of using ‘#’ to indicate feelings of squeamishness and a
superscripted ‘F’ to indicate intuitions of falsity. Many of these examples are collected or adopted from
the existing literature on truth value intuitions, i.e. Lasersohn (1993), von Fintel (2004), and Yablo (2006,
2009).
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(13) # The king of France read Anna Karenina.
(14) F The king of France wrote Anna Karenina.
(15) # The king of France always enjoys a croissant in the morning.
(16) F The king of France always enjoys some human flesh in the morning.
(17) # The king of France walked his dog last night.
(18) F The king of France ate his dog last night.
(19) # The king of France is BALD.5
(20) F The king of FRANCE is bald.
(21) # The king of France is on a STATE visit.
(22) F The king of FRANCE is on a state visit.
(23) # The king of France is bald.
(24) F Only the king of France is bald.
Briefly surveying the above contrast pairs makes perfectly clear the complexity of
the problem. Let’s consider some of the apparently intuition-changing causes. In (2)
the change in intuitions appears to be caused by the addition of the noun ‘nazi’.
However in (5–7) and (6–8) the intuition-changing factor is the difference between
the indefinite determiner and the demonstrative. In (11–12) and (13–14) intuitions
change due to a mere substitution of verbs, whereas in (19–20) and (21–22) into-
national stress forces an intuition of falsity. In (24), the focus-sensitive particle
‘only’ has a similar effect. In light of these cases, it seems that hopes of finding
some simple structural explanation are quickly dashed. While it’s possible to for-
mulate somewhat intuitive but ad hoc explanations for isolated cases, providing a
uniform explanation is a real challenge. Yet, if our semantic analysis is to capture
the data and refrain from making incorrect predictions, a uniform explanation is
clearly preferable, if not required.
1.2 Accommodation theories
In recent years, a couple of interesting proposals to explain the behavior of truth
value intuitions and their significance to semantics have emerged, namely
5 The capitals here indicate a pitch accent.
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Lasersohn (1993), von Fintel (2004), and Yablo (2006, 2009).6 While these theories
are different in various respects, they converge on a general idea. The common
contention is that truth value intuitions in no-reference cases are a result of a
mechanism of temporary accommodation of the false presupposition. When eval-
uating SWEPFs, evaluators (i.e. individuals consulting their intuitions) employ a
temporary accommodation of the presupposition to permit an evaluation of the
content of the SWEPF. The hypothesis is that if the result of accommodating the
presupposition is a proposition which the speaker is in a position to falsify by
deriving a contradiction, the sentence elicits an intuition of falsity. Conversely, if
the speaker is unable to falsify the proposition, e.g. not in a position to derive a
contradiction, the sentence is predicted to elicit no robust truth value intuition. On
Lasersohn’s (1993) and von Fintel’s (2004) proposals, this basic idea is formally
explicated in terms of belief revision procedures; the false presupposition is added
to the evaluator’s body of beliefs and the sentence under evaluation is tested against
this body of beliefs.7 If the evaluator is in a position to derive an inconsistency after
(a) accommodating the false presupposition and (b) adding the propositional content
of the relevant sentence, the SWEPF is judged false. If the evaluator is not in a
position to derive an inconsistency, the SWEPF is predicted to elicit squeamish-
ness.8 Consequently, these proposals share the basic assumption that truth value
intuitions must be explained in terms of a verification/falsification procedure.
While these proposals capture considerable parts of the data, I believe the general
strategy is problematic. I’ll briefly discuss what I take to be the two primary
problems. First, there is a class of cases for which these proposals yield systemat-
ically incorrect predictions and these incorrect predictions stem solely from the
6 There are important differences between these three analyses, but the objections I discuss here are
sufficiently general to apply to all three proposals. Two papers that also deserve mentioning are
Glanzberg (2005) and Geurts (2007). Glanzberg’s paper is a proposal to characterize the conditions under
which a sentence fails to express a proposition and it touches briefly on the topic of truth value intuitions
and presupposition failure. Glanzberg’s general contention is that truth value intuitions are too unstable to
provide solid data for theorizing and he suggests instead to rely on a range of discourse-based tests, so-
called repair tests. This line of reasoning is similar to the proposal I present here, but since Glanzberg’s
paper is not an attempt to explain the peculiar behavior of truth value intuitions, it engages with a very
limited number of examples. Geurts (2007) defends a Strawsonian analysis of strong determiners and
contends that Strawson’s view of presuppositions should be assimilated to the binding theory of pre-
suppositions, cf. (van der Sandt 1992). In this paper I also defend a broadly Strawsonian analysis, but I do
not discuss Geurts’ proposal since it fails to engage with, and cannot explain, a number of the cases
introduced in e.g. Fintel (2004). Moreover, since Geurts’ proposed analysis is quite similar to Strawson’s,
I believe it falls prey to a number of the problems that afflicts Strawson’s original proposal. These
problems are discussed in von Fintel’s paper. So, while I’m sympathetic to the overarching idea in
Geurts’ paper, I believe the proposal presented here provides a more satisfactory analysis.
7 Providing a detailed account of the relevant belief revision procedure faces a number of challenges. For
instance, bodies of beliefs must be closed under some suitable consequence relation, but adequately
characterizing that consequence relation is obviously no trivial task. Nevertheless, to attain correct
predictions, an adequate characterization is required. The most comprehensive attempt to provide an
adequate characterization of the belief revision procedure is given in von Fintel (2004). I’ll ignore
problems related to this issue for the remainder of this paper.
8 The crucial differences between these proposals lie in their explications of the revision procedure.
However, the problems related to these approaches are sufficiently general, so that we can ignore these
differences here. The proposals also diverge importantly in their assessments of the semantic significance
of these intuitions, but I’ll also ignore these differences.
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limitations of the strategy, namely the verification/falsification strategy which is
based on whether inconsistencies are derivable. The existence of this class puts into
question whether a verification/falsification strategy is equipped to explain how
truth value intuitions are in general generated. Let’s begin by considering a number
of the SWEPFs listed above. Using the verification/falsification procedure, the
accommodation theories make correct predictions for the paradigm cases (2) and (5).
Adding to our stock of beliefs that there is a king of France and that he is bald, gives
rise to no inconsistency and hence is predicted to elicit squeamishness. Conversely,
adding to our stock of beliefs that there is a king of France and that he is sitting in a
contextually salient chair does give rise to an inconsistency. Either the relevant
chair is empty or it’s occupied by someone who we know is not the king of France,
and so, doing simple derivations on our body of beliefs, we quickly derive a con-
tradiction. This is the desired result, since (5) elicits an intuition of falsity.9
However, when we start considering additional cases, these proposals run into
problems. First, a number of the listed contrast cases cannot be explained by these
proposals. For instance, the stark contrast between (2) and (3–4) is undetected by the
verification/falsification analysis; while there is no way of falsifying that the king of
France is bald (i.e. deriving a contradiction), there is also no way of falsifying that
he is a bald nazi. Analogous results obtain for the contrast pairs (15–16) and
(17–18). To explain the contrast between e.g. (2) and (4), the accommodation
theories must place heavy demands on bodies of beliefs; they must assume that
bodies of beliefs in general contain a proposition which is either inconsistent with
(4) or has an entailment that is inconsistent with (4). To capture the contrast, they
must therefore either attribute to speakers a general belief such as ‘no kings are
nazis’ or the more odious belief ‘the king of France is not a nazi’. Now, I take it as a
datum that it’s simply not feasible to ascribe the latter belief to speakers in general.
As regards the former, viz. the general belief that no kings are nazis, the question
arises whether it’s reasonable to assume that speakers in general have such a belief.
This is, to say the least, unclear. However, simply assuming that they do, only
because (4) elicits an intuition of falsity, deprives the proposals of explanatory
power. In that case we’re attributing beliefs to people simply to attain correct
predictions, but if the proposals are to explain intuitions, we need independent
justification for the assumption that speakers in general have such beliefs. It’s rather
difficult to see what would justify that assumption.
Now, because these analyses rely on verification/falsification, they rely crucially
on facts—facts which are in general known. But this means that if the facts required
to falsify a sentence are not known (or on von Fintel’s account, something that could
not in principle be known), the sentence is predicted to elicit a sense of squea-
mishness. As a result, any sentence which ascribes e.g. a non-factive mental state
(i.e. a non-factive propositional attitude) to a non-referring definite is predicted to
elicit squeamishness. There are of course no facts about what, say, the king of
France’s mental states are, and as a result we have no beliefs about the mental states
9 It should be noted that von Fintel’s (2004) revision procedure is more sophisticated than e.g. Laser-
sohn’s (1993) which allows him to capture more data. Nevertheless, the cases adduced below are
problematic for both Lasersohn, von Fintel, and Yablo.
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of the king of France (presumably because he doesn’t exists). Consequently, any
sentence of that form should elicit a sense of squeamishness. Nevertheless, con-
structing examples of that form which elicit robust intuitions of falsity is an easy
task. Consider the cases below.
(25) F The king of France hates your mother.
(26) F The king of France is planning a nuclear attack on the US.
(27) F The king of France wants to steal your car.
These sentences seem to me to elicit robust intuitions of falsity, but because of the
inherent limitations of the verification/falsification strategy, the accommodation
theories cannot predict this. These results constitute a real challenge to the claim
that we’re somehow relying on a tacit verification/falsification procedure when
generating these intuitions. It’s just not clear that verification/falsification is at issue
here.
This brings us to what I consider the other primary problem with the accom-
modation theories. On these analyses, no explanation is provided of the fragility of
truth value intuitions. Many SWEPFs elicit no robust intuitions when considered in
isolation, but suddenly elicit quite robust intuitions of falsity when considered in
context. In other words, truth value intuitions are delicate and easily affected by
contextual factors. Any analysis attempting to explain the behavior of these delicate
intuitions that nevertheless fails to explain their significant sensitivity to context is
bound to be afflicted with predictive shortcomings. Because the accommodation
theories have no resources to explain such variations, there are numerous cases of
SWEPFs whose behavior in context remains but a mystery. Given a SWEPF and a
relevant body of beliefs, the accommodation theories make a firm prediction, and as
long as the context engenders no change in the body of beliefs, this prediction
remains the same. But, as I’ll demonstrate in the next section, context can engender
a change in truth value intuitions without altering in any substantial way the relevant
body of beliefs.10 The accommodation theories are at a loss to explain this kind of
variation.
I submit that if we are to have any hope of sorting out this mess, we must focus
our attention elsewhere, viz. away from SWEPFs evaluated in isolation. If we want
to gain a better understanding of truth value intuitions in regards to SWEPFs, we
must examine their behavior in context.
1.3 Systematizing the Strawsonian insights
My proposal is very much an elaboration of ideas put forward in Strawson’s seminal
(1964) paper. I take my analysis to be a rigorous systematization of Strawson’s main
insights which avoids the unfortunate consequences of his proposed solution.
Strawson originally cast his solution to the problem in terms of a distinction
10 Relevant cases here include (28) and (29).
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between topic and focus, and he conjectured that intuitions of falsity are elicited
only when non-referring definites are not in topic position. He therefore proposed to
analyze definites in focus position as non-presuppositional, since this would allow
these sentences to be assigned classical truth values in accordance with our pur-
ported intuitions. However, Strawson’s proposal is problematic on several counts.
First, it’s convincingly argued in e.g. von Fintel (2004) that definites are presup-
positional irregardless of their sentence topic/focus placement.11 Secondly, on
Strawson’s proposed method for identifying sentence topics, his proposal makes a
number of incorrect predictions. Many sentences elicit strong intuitions of falsity
even though the non-referring definite is in, what Strawson considered, topic
position.12 The present analysis is designed to avoid these consequences while
retaining the basic idea in Strawson, namely that discourse topics, or rather ques-
tions under discussion, play an essential role in generating intuitions.
2 SWEPFs in context
The accommodation theories afford little attention to the influence of context on
truth value intuitions. The tacit assumption is that contextual information plays no
significant role, since conflicting intuitions are elicited even when no explicit
contextual information is supplied—as witnessed in the contrast pairs listed earlier.
It’s therefore presupposed that it’s sufficient to provide an explanation of isolated
SWEPFs, or in Strawson’s words, SWEPFs evaluated as ‘asserted abruptly and out
context’ (Strawson 1964, p. 68). Nevertheless, explaining how minor variations in
sentence content and sentence form are capable of affecting intuitions in such a
remarkable way has proved exceedingly complicated, so in this section, I want to
explore and discuss the behavior of truth value intuitions in context. The hope is that
this will provide important insights into their curious behavior.
An interesting characteristic of squeamish SWEPFs, that is SWEPFs which are
liable to elicit a sense of squeamishness when asserted abruptly and out of context,
is the ease with which these sentences are transformed into SWEPFs which elicit an
immediate sense of falsity. In particular it seems that only minimal contextual
framing is required to transform a sense of squeamishness into a robust intuition of
falsity. To illustrate this, consider the cases below.
(2) # The king of France is bald.
(8) # The king of France owns a pen.
11 Cf. the ‘Hey, Wait a Minute!’-test (Fintel 2004, pp. 322–325).
12 Whether the topic/focus interpretation of Strawson’s proposal is correct is somewhat controversial.
This is the predominant interpretation of Strawson in the literature, but some authors, e.g. Anne
Bezuidenhout (p.c.) and Kadmon (2001) suggest alternative interpretations. Kadmon (2001, p. 402ff)
contends that Strawson has in mind questions under discussion, rather than topic/focus and on that
interpretation, my proposal is very much an elaboration of Strawson’s suggestions.
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(15) #The king of France always enjoys a croissant in the morning.
Without any contextual information, these sentences are liable to elicit a feeling of
squeamishness, i.e. an inability to evaluate them for truth or falsity. However, with a
minimal amount of contextual information, the sentences are quickly transformed
into robust SWEPFs. Here’s a simple case. Suppose you’re compiling a list of every
monarch in Europe who owns a pen. Suppose someone utters (8).13 In this context,
when evaluating the sentence in relation to a salient question, the assertion seems to
elicit an intuition of falsity. Asserted abruptly and out of context, that sentence
elicits squeamishness, but this minor tweak in the context seems to change intu-
itions. In other words, we don’t need much from context to get falsity judgments. To
drive the point home, I present two cases where a suitably enriched context appears
to facilitate falsity intuitions. These enriched context do not have any relevant effect
on bodies of beliefs. In other words, the accommodation theories discussed in the
previous section have no explanation for these variations.
(28) Context I
The famous hair-dresser, Pierre, is organizing a fashion show, where the
hair-models are all European royalty. Incidentally, minimalism is the new
black in hair-style fashion, so Pierre is trying to determine whether he can
convince some royality to go bald for the show. As he’s deliberating, he
turns to you and his other assistants and says: I can’t think of any royal who
would agree to go bald just for the sake of the fashion show, and I can’t
think of any who is already bald. You guys get on this immediately.
Whoever finds a solution gets to go to the fashion show. Another assistant
standing next to you exclaims: ‘The king of France is bald’.
I think there’s a natural inclination here to judge that the assistant’s utterance of (2)
is straightforwardly false. Now, recall that (2) is the paradigm example of a sentence
that elicits no robust intuitions when asserted abruptly and out context. Here is
another example.
(29) Context II
A salesman from the company Froggy Croissants is attempting to persuade
you that your high-end bakery should start selling croissants from Froggy
Croissants. You’re sceptical and say: ‘The problem is this. Our customers
are primarily wealthy snobs with poor taste who only buy products which
are trendy or hip. So, unless Paris Hilton or some other celebrity is eating
croissants on a regular basis, we won’t be able to sell them’ The salesman
retorts: ‘I take your point, but you see, our product is extremely popular in
France. For instance, the king of France always enjoys a croissant in the
morning’.
13 Strawson uses the example ‘What examples, if any, are there of famous contemporary figures who are
bald?’. These cases are often noted in the literature, but proposals to explain these cases are fairly infrequent.
Descriptions, truth value intuitions, and questions 593
123
pe
er
-0
05
77
97
0,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
8 
M
ar
 2
01
1
When (15) is embedded in the above context, it seems to me that it’s natural
to again judge it straightforwardly false. Again, observe that this sentence
elicits no robust intuitions when evaluated without explicit contextual infor-
mation.
The principal question is why intuitions change in the above contexts. It’s
easily recognized that not any addition of contextual information is sufficient for
achieving an intuition-changing effect, and that the context must be primed in a
suitable way. For instance, suppose that the salesman in the latter context retorted
by uttering I take your point, but you see, our product is extremely popular in
France. For instance, the king of France is bald. While this would be a very odd
thing for the salesman to say, indeed a clearly inappropriate assertion, I think
there is no sense in which a robust judgment of falsity automatically results. Yet,
it takes little imagination to construct utterance contexts which are suitable for
changing a sense of squeamishness into a robust intuition, so the question
remains.
In addition to contextual framing, there are other curious ways of altering intu-
itions. For instance, prosodic focus is often noted to have effects similar to those
observed with contextualized SWEPFs. Consider the sentences in (30–32)—capitals
indicate a pitch accent.
(30) F The king of FRANCE is bald.
(31) F The king of FRANCE owns a pen.
(32) F The king of FRANCE always enjoys a croissant in the morning.
Here I think there is a rather striking contrast between the sentences above and their
unfocused counterparts. In particular, when the non-referring determiner phrase is
focused, indicated above by a pitch accent on the proper name ‘France’, these
sentences pull immediate intuitions towards falsity. This is surprising, because it’s
standardly assumed that absent certain focus-sensitive particles (e.g. ‘only’), focus
has no truth conditional effects. Nevertheless truth value intuitions appear to be
affected by the focus.14
Similar perplexing effects on truth value intuitions are observed with certain
syntactic constructions, e.g. clefts.
(33) F It is the king of France who is bald.
14 For the accommodation theories, which purport to explain intuitions of falsity in terms of inconsis-
tencies, this data is particularly problematic. While focus is assumed to have the semantic effect that a set
of contextually constrained alternatives is computed, it’s unclear how such a set of alternatives is to be
used to derive an inconsistency. There is therefore no obvious way for the accommodation theorists to
explain the effects of prosodic focusing on truth value intuitions. I’m grateful to Nate Charlow for making
this point more clear to me.
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Again, I think there’s a strong pull towards falsity here rather than squeamishness.
Notice that the existential presupposition triggered by the cleft should not affect our
intuitions here, since it’s perfectly compatible with our knowledge that someone is
bald.15
In the remainder of this paper, I provide an alternative explanation of the relation
between truth value intuitions and SWEPFs and I propose a tentative procedure for
predicting when SWEPFs elicit intuitions of falsity or at least pull our intuitions in
the direction of falsity. This procedure also provides an important explanation of the
curious behavior of these intuitions—in particular, why they’re so easily changed by
context.
2.1 Discourses and questions
SWEPFs typically elicit one of two contrastive reactions. One either judges that the
SWEPF is false or one feels a sense of squeamishness, viz. an inability to judge
whether the SWEPF is true or false. As emphasized by von Fintel (2004), the
unifying characteristic of both these reactions is that the informational content of the
SWEPF is rejected. For instance, if the SWEPF is asserted in the context of a
discourse, then regardless of the interlocutors’ particular reaction to the SWEPF, the
informational content of the SWEPF is rejected from the common ground.16 The
question is how to explain this prominent difference in reactions, and I suggest that
an answer can be found by considering certain facts about discourse structure,
discourse goals, and questions.
The central contention in this paper is that a very large class of falsity intuitions
result from evaluating the content of a SWEPF in relation to a contextually salient
question. The hypothesis is that when certain contextual/conversational conditions
are satisfied, SWEPFs elicit intuitions of falsity. In particular, if a SWEPF is
evaluated as what I label a consonant response to a contextually salient question and
the relevant question has true answers, the SWEPF is judged false. The purpose of
the present section is to provide a systematic and detailed explication of these
conditions. I therefore adopt a theory of information structure in discourses based on
Roberts (1998, 2004). This is a convenient framework to examine how intuitions
behave in certain types of discourses, namely discourses where information
exchange is the primary objective.
15 One might think that the culprit here is an exclusivity implicature which clefts are often argued to
convey. However, if in the context it’s clear that the identity of a single individual is sought, and thus a
potential exclusivity implicature is satisfied, (33) still elicits an intuition of falsity. I thank an anonymous
reviewer at L&P for pointing this out.
16 I’m deliberately ignoring cases involving presupposition accommodation, since these are irrelevant
here. My concern is with cases where the interlocutors know that the presupposition is false and resist
accommodation. For excellent discussions of accommodation, cf. Beaver and Zeevat (2004) and von
Fintel (2008).
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3 Discourse structure
Following Roberts (1998, 2004), let’s assume that the goal of a discourse is to
address and answer certain questions under discussion (QUDs).17 Roberts writes,
I assume that the primary goal of discourse is communal inquiry – the
intention to discover with other interlocutors‘‘the way things are’’, to share
information about our world. [. . .] The linguistic counterpart of an inquiry is a
question. Thus, we might take questions to be formal objects that reflect
interlocutors’ intentions in conducting discourse. (Roberts 2004, p. 208)
Let’s make the additional assumption that in order to count as a discourse partici-
pant, one has an antecedent interest, or one immediately acquires an interest, in
addressing or answering the QUDs—or as Roberts puts it, to count as a discourse
participant is to accept a proffered question. Finally, let’s assume that when a
speaker engages in a discourse, the speaker is presupposing that someone in the
discourse (e.g. the speaker herself) is capable of relevantly addressing or answering
the QUD. Adopting this model of discourses allows us to examine the relation
between reactions to SWEPFs and QUDs. In particular, it helps illustrate that the
extent to which the asserted SWEPF addresses a QUD has a significant influence on
our reactions to the SWEPF.
On this picture, discourses contain at least one QUD and this question is accepted
by the discourse participants. The goal of the discourse is to answer the QUD, and
speakers may employ different strategies to achieve that goal. One strategy is to
attempt to answer the QUD, the primary question, by addressing and answering a
range of subquestions. A subquestion is defined as a question entailed by the pri-
mary QUD, i.e. the question in (34) entails the subquestions s1 , s2 , s3 etc.
(34) What did Mary eat?
ð34Þ
s1 Did Mary eat clams?
s2 Did Mary eat braised short ribs?
s3 Did Mary eat veal shanks?
..
. ..
.
sn Did Mary eat a tomato salad?
8
>
>>
>
<
>
>
>
>:
This entailment relation for questions is defined as follows: (34) entails s1 , s2 , s3
etc. because a complete and exhaustive answer to (34) would entail an answer to
these subquestions. Conversely, answering a subquestion is to provide a partial
answer to the primary question and answering every subquestion is therefore to
provide a complete answer to the primary question. Now, on this rough picture of
17 Roberts’ model relies importantly on the notions of a common ground and a context set as developed
in Stalnaker (1970, 1974, 1978, 1998, 2002). On Stalnaker’s theory, adding a proposition to the common
ground is represented by the set theoretic operation of intersection, namely intersecting the set of worlds
denoted by the proposition and the set of worlds already in the context set.
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discourse structure, Roberts defines a notion of relevant conversational moves. A
conversational move m, Roberts says, is relevant to the QUD if and only if m
introduces a partial answer to the primary question or is part of a strategy to answer
the primary question. Partial answers to a QUD can be given both directly or
indirectly, i.e. one can relevantly address a QUD by asserting a sentence which
(contextually) entails or implicates an answer to the QUD. Moreover, a conversa-
tional move m is part of a strategy to answer the primary QUD if e.g. it proposes a
subquestion to the primary QUD or serves to restrict the domain of inquiry. For
example, one can propose a subquestion but restrict the domain so as to exclude
certain answers as irrelevant with regards to the QUD.
3.1 Consonance
There are two predominant semantic analyses of questions, namely proposition-based
analyses on which questions are analyzed as sets of propositions where these prop-
ositions constitute possible answers, see e.g Hamblin (1973) and Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1984), and functional (or categorial) analyses on which questions are
analyzed as functions from individuals to truth values, see e.g. Hausser (1983), Scha
(1983), Krifka (2001, 2004). Now, since Roberts defines relevant assertions in terms
of (direct or indirect) possible answers, relevant conversational moves do not include
assertions that contain non-denoting DPs as constituents. Since non-denoting DPs are
not mapped to individuals in a model, such assertions cannot be members of answer
sets. Consequently, on both the proposition-based and the functional analyses of
questions, assertions of sentences with non-referring constituents do not constitute
possible answers. In this section I therefore intend to characterize an alternative set of
conversational moves which are intuitively interpreted as cooperative and as
addressing a QUD even if they fail to provide an answer to the QUD. So, let’s say that
a conversational move m is consonant only if (a) the speaker intends to answer a
QUD, (b) the speaker could reasonably be interpreted by the interlocutors as
intending to answer the QUD, and (c) if the presuppositions of the relevant assertion
were accommodated, the assertion would provide a (direct or indirect) answer to the
QUD. In other words, for a conversational move to be consonant, it’s strictly speaking
not required that it provides an answer to the QUD, viz. a proposition/individual
contained in the relevant answer set. Rather, what is required is that the conversa-
tional move could reasonably be interpreted by the interlocutors as an attempt to
answer the QUD and that if its presuppositions were accommodated, it would either
entail or implicate a proposition/individual contained in the answer set. On this
characterization, the set of conversational moves consisting of assertions of true and
false answers to a QUD is only a proper subset of the set of consonant conversational
moves. The set of consonant conversational moves also contains speech acts which do
not provide genuine answers to the QUD, yet are interpreted as such. The set of
consonant conversational moves is a proper subset of the set of appropriate conver-
sational moves. Not every appropriate conversational move is consonant, since not
every appropriate conversational move can reasonably be interpreted as intending to
answer a QUD. Here is a crude illustration.
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(35) Who ate the braised short ribs?
a1 Mary. þrelevant / þconsonant /þappropriate
a2 Mary is a vegetarian. þrelevant / þconsonant / þappropriate
a3 I don’t know. relevant / consonant / þappropriate
a4 Mary jumped the fence. relevant / consonant / )appropriate
The response in (35-a1 ) is a genuine answer to the QUD and thus a consonant
conversational move even if Mary did not eat the braised short ribs. While the
response in (35-a2 ) is not a direct answer to the QUD, it implicates an answer to a
subquestion and is therefore also a consonant conversational move. Conversely, a
response such as (35-a3 ) is an inconsonant conversational move. It’s inconsonant
because a speaker asserting (35-a3 ) is not attempting to answer the QUD. Indeed,
the speaker asserts that she’s not in a position to answer the question. Nevertheless,
this is a perfectly appropriate response to the question insofar as the speaker fails to
know the answer. Finally, the response in (35-a4 ) is also an inconsonant conver-
sational move. Here the speaker cannot reasonably be interpreted as attempting to
answer the QUD.18
In the representation in (35) it seems that the set of consonant and relevant
conversational moves coincide, so why is the notion of consonance needed? Con-
sonance is designed to capture an intuitive aspect of conversational pertinence that
extends beyond the set of conversational moves which provide (directly or indi-
rectly) answers to a QUD. Where a relevant conversational move must ultimately
provide an answer (directly or indirectly), a consonant conversational move need
not do this. The idea is that intuitions of falsity with regards to SWEPFs depend
importantly on the relation between a speech act, its content, and a given QUD, and
it’s this important relation which consonance is designed to capture. To characterize
the set of conversational moves which give rise to falsity intuitions, a class of
conversational moves extending beyond a set genuine answers is required. As I’ve
emphasized already, if wh-questions are defined in terms of sets of propositions, or
as functions from individuals to truth values, purported responses which contain a
non-denoting DP fail to constitute a genuine answer. For example, if the relevant set
of answers is a set of propositions, it won’t contain any elements which have non-
denoting DPs as their constituents. Similarly, if the relevant set of answers is a set of
individuals, it won’t contain non-existing individuals. Nevertheless, there is a clear
intuitive sense in which certain responses to questions, where the asserted response
contains a non-referring term, can be interpreted as a purported answer even though
it’s not a genuine answer to a QUD. For example, suppose we’re discussing who
proved Goldbach’s conjecture. If I sincerely assert that the mathematician who
proved Goldbach’s conjecture is a woman, there is a clear sense in which my
18 On this characterization of sets of conversational moves (CM), the following relations obtain:
CM1  CM2  CM3; where A ¼ fp : p is a true or a false answer to a QUDg; CM1 ¼ fm : m is an
assertion of p where p 2 Ag; CM2 ¼ fm : m is consonant; g and CM3 ¼ fm : m is appropriate/
felicitousg . In other words, the set of appropriate/felicitous conversational moves is going to contain both
true answers, false answers, merely purported answers, and claims of ignorance. In this characterization,
answers are assumed to be propositions, but it should be obvious that it can easily be assimilated to a
functional analysis of questions where e.g. single constituent questions denote sets of individuals.
598 A. J. Schoubye
123
pe
er
-0
05
77
97
0,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
8 
M
ar
 2
01
1
assertion is acceptable, cooperative, and addressing the QUD. Of course, no one has
proved Goldbach’s conjecture, so the real problem is that the discourse is defective.
But despite defectiveness, my response is easily interpreted as an intended answer to
the QUD. In other words, the deciding factors for obeying consonance is whether
the speaker can reasonably be interpreted as answering the QUD and whether the
assertion could answer the QUD were its presuppositions accommodated. Conse-
quently, as the notions are used here, (35-a5 ) is a consonant conversational move in
response to (35). It’s not a relevant conversational move, because it fails to provide
a genuine answer (directly or indirectly) to the QUD.
(35) a5 The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s conjecture ate
the braised short ribs. relevant / þconsonant / þappropriate
3.2 The false intuition hypothesis (FIH)
SWEPFs asserted in discourses are never incorporated into the common ground as
partial or complete answers to a relevant QUD. The question is why SWEPFs
nevertheless elicit contrasting judgments. I contend that when the content of a
SWEPF is interpreted as relating to a QUD, in particular when it’s interpreted as a
consonant conversational move, the SWEPF elicits an intuition of falsity rather than
squeamishness. The important point to emphasize is that a SWEPF is evaluated in
relation to a QUD only when it’s interpreted as a consonant conversational move.
However, falsity judgments also depend on the relevant discourse. In particular, if a
discourse is defective, i.e. if the QUD has no true answers, a consonant assertion of
a SWEPF is not guaranteed to elicit a falsity judgment. The hypothesis is therefore
that when an assertion of a SWEPF satisfies the conditions below, the SWEPF
elicits an intuition of falsity.
(a) The SWEPF is interpreted as a consonant conversational move as regards the
QUD or a subquestion to the QUD.
(b) The relevant QUD has true answers.19
But what would explain this hypothesized generalization? Why do intuitions change
when these conversational conditions are satisfied? Here is a tentative explanation:
A non-defective discourse contains a QUD which has true answers and the only
relevant assertions in such a discourse are assertions which (directly or indirectly)
provide a partial or complete answer to the QUD. Every other assertion is irrelevant.
However, when we evaluate an assertion in a given discourse, the primary issue is
whether the assertion succeeds in providing a true answer to the QUD, i.e. only true
answers further the goal of the discourse. But in the cases under consideration here,
namely assertions of SWEPFs, we’re aware that the definite fails to refer, and so it’s
immediately clear that the assertion could not succeed in answering the QUD. As a
19 Probably, what’s required here is actually a strictly speaking weaker condition, namely that the QUD
is not known to have no true answers. However, I rely on this slightly simpler condition for the remainder
of the paper.
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result the assertion is not furthering the goal of the discourse. However, if it’s
consonant, it’s interpreted as cooperative and as an attempt to provide a true answer
to the QUD. For this reason, it’s grouped among consonant assertions which do not
further the goal of the discourse, namely false answers to the QUD. In other words,
it seems plausible that consonant assertions of SWEPFs have the same conversa-
tional status as consonant assertions of straightforwardly false non-SWEPFs. From
the point of view of the discourse participants, these are simply not furthering the
goal of the discourse, which is to resolve the QUD. Consequently, the SWEPFs are
grouped with other consonant non-SWEPFs (viz. other false answers) and since
conversational moves that further the goal of the discourse correlate with true
answers, the hypothesis is that consonant conversational moves which do not further
the goal of the discourse are naturally interpreted as correlating with false answers.
Before considering the predictions of the present conjecture, it’s important to
emphasize its scope. In some cases, a SWEPF may give rise to a falsity judgment
even when the conditions of the FIH are seemingly unsatisfied. In other words,
squeamishness is harder to predict. However, it’s plausible that a sense of squea-
mishness is elicited only when at least one of the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) the SWEPF is interpreted as an inconsonant conversational move, (b) the
speaker is unable to determine which of several salient questions the assertion is
purporting to answer, or (c) the discourse is defective.
3.3 Predictions
The FIH provides a straightforward explanation of the changes in truth value
intuitions observed with the contextualized SWEPFs from Sect. 2, namely (28) and
(29). Why do we judge that the assistant’s assertion of (2) is false in the context
described in (28)? The simple explanation is this: (28) is a discourse context where
the QUD is arguably ‘who would agree to go bald for the fashion show’. On the
most easily accessible interpretation, the assistant’s response is understood as a
purported answer to the QUD. In other words, a consonant conversational move, but
a false answer to the question. On this explication of (28), the SWEPF asserted by
the assistant satisfies both conditions of the FIH and is therefore predicted to be
false. This is the correct prediction, since (2) seems to elicit an immediate intuition
of falsity when asserted in the context of (28).
An analogous explanation applies to (29) where the initial QUD is arguably
‘should you buy croissants from Froggy Croissants?’ It’s subsequently determined
in the discourse that the answer to that question is conditional on another question,
namely whether a famous celebrity also buys croissants from Froggy Croissants.
This then generates a new QUD, roughly ‘which if any celebrity buys Froggy
Croissants?’ In response to this QUD, the salesman’s assertion of (15) is again
interpreted as a consonant conversational move, but a not true answer to the QUD.
Both conditions of the FIH are thereby satisfied and the SWEPF is predicted to elicit
falsity. Again, this is the desired prediction.
Let’s consider a couple of additional examples. The SWEPFs in (36a) and (37a)
seem to elicit a sense of squeamishness when evaluated as asserted abruptly and out
of context. However, when these SWEPFs are interpreted as consonant responses to
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a QUD and the discourse is non-defective, it seems to me that these sentences then
elicit intuitions of falsity.
(36) Who is on a state visit?
a. F The king of France is on a state visit.
(37) Is anyone reading Russian literature these days?
a. F The king of France read Anna Karenina.
(36a) is a consonant conversational move because it’s easily interpreted as a pur-
ported answer to the question in (36) and were it’s presuppositions satisfied, it
would constitute a genuine answer to the question. It’s judged false, but this is
predicted by the FIH, because both conditions are satisfied. The response in (37a) is
also very easily interpreted as implicating an answer to the question in (37) and
were it’s presuppositions satisfied it would. This is sufficient for it to count as a
consonant conversational move. Again, the SWEPF is judged false and this is
predicted by the FIH—both conditions are satisfied.
While these cases have a relatively artificial feel, it’s simple to construct these
examples and they appear to confirm the FIH. I conclude this section by empha-
sizing that what I’m suggesting here is a general criterion for determining when and
why SWEPFs are judged false; they’re judged false when the relevant conditions are
satisfied and they’re judged false because when the relevant conditions are satisfied,
the defect exhibited by the SWEPF is negligible. When a response is consonant, the
speaker is not immediately interpreted as uncooperative (perhaps just confused) and
this is the reason that the defect is negligible. In subsequent sections, I demonstrate
that a number of prima facie perplexing cases can be explained along the lines
suggested here, viz. if a SWEPF satisfies the conditions of the FIH, it’s judged false.
3.4 Consonance constraints
One interesting class of sentences, which in certain cases could seem to constitute
prima facie problems for the FIH, are SWEPFs where the non-denoting description
contains a (complex) demonstrative. Uses of such descriptions, even in the context
of a QUD, can elicit squeamishness rather than judgments of falsity. For instance,
suppose we’re engaged in a discourse, where the QUD is (38a). If a speaker asserts
(38b) as an answer to this question, but demonstrates, say, an empty chair, it seems
to me that this sentence fails to elicit a robust intuition of falsity.
(38) a. Who’s is bald?
b. #The woman sitting in that chair is bald.
However, we should not accept that (38b) is a consonant conversational move.
Consonance requires that it’s reasonable for the interlocutors to interpret the speaker
as intending to provide an answer to the QUD. However, in the discursive exchange
above, this is clearly not reasonable. Since the speaker is demonstrating an empty
chair, it’s not feasible to ascribe to her the belief that there is woman sitting in the
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relevant empty chair. Moreover, there’s no way of interpreting the speaker as simply
not knowing that the chair is empty. In other words, it’s not possible to interpret the
speaker as if she simply assumes that the demonstrative refers while maintaining the
assumption that she’s cooperative. As a result, there’s no way of evaluating the
speaker’s claim. The speaker’s assertion of (38b) is therefore an inconsonant con-
versational move and the conditions of the FIH are not satisfied. In other words,
consonance places demands on communicative cooperation. Now consider (39).
(39) a. Who’s is bald?
b. ?? The naked and invisible donkey standing in the center of
the room with an iPhone in its mouth is bald.
My immediate judgment of (39b) is that it comes across as perplexing and odd
rather than false. But again, I think this judgment should be explained in terms of
inconsonance. The answer in (39b) is so bizarre that it obscures intuitions. Why?
Because it’s quite hard to attribute to the speaker the belief that there is an indi-
vidual satisfying the DP restrictor ‘naked and invisible donkey standing in the center
of the room with an iPhone in its mouth’. Consequently, it’s quite difficult to
evaluate the speaker’s claim. The response thus fails to count as a consonant con-
versational move, because the speaker asserting (39b) cannot reasonably be inter-
preted as cooperative and attempting to provide an answer to the QUD.
The last provisional problem for the FIH discussed here concerns cases where an
answer is implicated by reporting. Consider the following question-answer pair.
(40) Who ate the braised short ribs?
a. Mary thinks that Barney ate the braised short ribs.
Insofar as the response in (40a) is consonant, it’s consonant because it succeeds in
implicating an answer to the QUD, namely that Barney ate the braised short ribs.
Compare this to (40b) which strikes me as predominantly odd rather than
straightforwardly false.
(40) b. ?? The king of France thinks that Barney ate the braised short ribs.
If the response in (40a ) succeeds in implicating an answer to the QUD, one might
be inclined to think that (40b) should also succeed in implicating an answer, namely
that the king of France ate the braised short ribs. And since (40b) fails to elicit an
immediate intuition of falsity, this seems to constitute a counter-example to the FIH.
The crucial question here is when and why a response such as (40a) is consonant,
viz. succeeds in implicating an answer to the QUD. It seems plausible that a speaker
asserting (40a) is tacitly assuming that Mary’s thoughts on the issue are relevant to
resolving the QUD and that the interlocutors must accept (or come to accept) this
assumption. In other words, one might think that the response in (40a) is consonant
only if it’s common ground, or could become common ground, that Mary’s opinion
on the issue can help settle the question. In contrast, it’s not common ground (and it
could not become common ground) that the king of France’s thoughts on the issue
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could help settle the question. For this reason (40b) sounds odd. I also think, in
support of this explanation, that for most discourses revolving around a QUD such
as (40), a response such as (40c) elicits roughly the same intuitive reactions as (40b).
(40) c. ?? Noam Chomsky thinks that Barney ate the braised short ribs.
In other words, if a speaker offers the opinion of some individual in response to a
QUD, this individual’s opinion is relevant only on the supposition that she/he is
likely to know the answer to the QUD. Consequently, one might think that each
response above is interpreted as an answer to a subquestion, namely what the
opinion of x is where it can be established in the context that x is an individual
whose opinion is relevant to resolving the QUD.20 One might also think that the
common ground determines which subquestions of this kind are relevant in a dis-
course, but that a speaker can introduce additional subquestions into the discourse as
long as the discourse participants do not object. So if a speaker asserts (40b) in
response to (40), the speaker is interpreted as addressing an irrelevant subquestion.
I.e. since there is no king of France, it cannot be established in the context that the
opinion of the king of France is relevant to resolving the QUD.
This explanation salvages the FIH because with respect to the primary QUD, the
response in (40b) is not interpreted as providing either a partial or complete answer
to the primary QUD, but rather as providing an answer to a question which is
irrelevant and moreover has no true answers.
In the next section, I discuss a particular advantage of the present proposal,
namely that it provides a simple and intuitive explanation of the focus cases briefly
introduced earlier. No proposal for explaining the curious behavior of truth value
intuitions has, to my knowledge, provided a substantial and systematic explanation
of these cases.
4 Prosodic focus
Focus is standardly assumed to have no truth conditional effects save for interac-
tions with focus-sensitive operators. Nevertheless, when the definite descriptions in
(30–32) are focused using e.g. pitch accents, this does seem to impact immediate
judgments.
(30) F The king of FRANCE is bald.
(31) F The king of FRANCE owns a pen.
20 In support of an explanation in terms of subquestions, it seems that a natural prosodic contour for the
responses above involve so-called B-accented subject phrases which is the standard indicator for con-
trastive topics, cf. Roberts (2009). If these subject phrases function as contrastive topics, it’s natural to
interpret them as intended answers to additional subquestions. This relation between contrastive topics
and subquestions is extensively discussed in Kadmon (2001, 2009). I discuss the effects of prosodic
focusing more generally in the subsequent section. I thank an anonymous reviewer at L&P for suggesting
the explanation involving contrastive topics.
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(32) F The king of FRANCE always enjoys a croissant in the morning.
While these sentences normally elicit no robust intuitions, focusing appears to pull
immediate intuitions towards falsity. These effects are quite curious and existing
analyses of truth value intuitions are at a loss to explain them. The crucial question
is how focusing affects intuitions and moreover why. However, these effects can be
readily explained by the FIH, but demonstrating this requires a minor digression. In
the subsequent paragraphs I therefore provide a brief explication of the notion of
prosodic focus and present an analysis of its pragmatic and semantic properties.
In a variety of languages (incl. English) pitch accents are used to realize prosodic
focus. Intuitively, speakers use prosodic focusing in order to contrast the focused
material with something already salient in the discourse. For instance, the use of
prosodic focus is particularly prevalent when speakers attempt to emend incorrect
information in a discourse. This is typically labeled ‘contrastive focus’ and illus-
trated in (41).
(41) a. Mary ate clams.
b. No, JOHN ate clams.
On standard analyses, it’s assumed that prosodic focus divides the content of an
expression into two parts, the background and the focus. The background is con-
strued as information which is already given in the context, whereas the focused
material is construed as new information. Alternatively, one might roughly say that
focus-marked material is information intended to be added to the common ground,
whereas the non-focused material (the backgrounded material) is assumed to be
antecedently established. This division of the content can be neatly represented
using function/argument pairs, where the backgrounded information is represented
by a function and the new information is represented by an argument (cf. the
(c)-cases below).
(42) a. MARY ate clams. )
b. hBackground, Focusi )
c. hkx:x ate clams; Maryi
(43) a. Mary ATE clams. )
b. hBackground, Focusi )
c. hkR:Mary R clams; eati
(44) a. Mary ate CLAMS. )
b. hBackground, Focusi )
c. hkx:Mary ate x; clamsi
Although focus is realized by pitch accenting single words or syllables, it’s gen-
erally accepted that focus often extends to larger syntactic constituents (i.e. DPs,
VPs etc.). Even though the pitch accents in (30–32) are placed on the proper name
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‘France’, the focus-marking can extend to the entire DP. The problem of under-
standing the relation between prosody and focus-marking—sometimes referred to as
focus projection—has spawned a lively discussion which I’ll refrain from engaging
in here. However, it should be noted that focal scope places important restrictions on
use. So, in order to distinguish focus-marking from particular prosodic realizations
of focus, I’ll indicate focal scope using square brackets with a subscripted f, and use
capitals to indicate pitch accents. So, (30–32) should be represented as below.
(30) F [The king of FRANCE]f is bald.
(31) F [The king of FRANCE]f owns a pen.
(32) F [The king of FRANCE]f always enjoys a croissant in the morning.
4.1 Structured meanings: the semantics and pragmatics of focus
It’s generally assumed that there is an important relation between the semantic and
pragmatic effects of focus and the semantics of questions. The currently predomi-
nant semantic analyses focus, namely Alternative Semantics and Structured
Meanings, are therefore extensions of the currently predominant analyses of ques-
tions. In particular, Alternative Semantics is a proposition-based analysis extending
the proposition-based semantic analysis of questions, whereas Structured Meanings
is a functional analysis, extending the functional semantic analysis of questions. In
the exposition here, I use a Structured Meanings analysis, but I want to emphasize
that an analysis using Alternative Semantics makes identical predictions.21
On the functional analysis of questions, as previously mentioned, wh-questions
denote functions from individuals to truth values which are obtained by lambda-
abstracting on the wh-phrases (or rather the denotations of the wh-phrases). This
analysis therefore assigns a very intuitive meaning to questions, namely a function
which takes answers as its arguments. A question such as (45a) is therefore analyzed
as (45b).
(45) a. What did Mary eat?
b. kx: Mary ate x  k-abstracting on the wh-phrase
The Structured Meanings account of focus extends the basic idea in the Structured
Meanings semantics for questions. Focus-induced interpretations of sentences are
obtained by lambda-abstracting on the focus-marked constituents. This produces the
focus-induced structured meaning of the sentence, namely an ordered sequence
21 Structured Meanings is discussed in Stechow (1989, 1991), and Krifka (1991, 2001). Alternative
Semantics was introduced by Mats Rooth in (1985) and further discussed in Rooth (1992, 1996). These
theories diverge in important respects, but the differences only emerge at a fairly detailed level of
analysis. As regards the cases under consideration here, the predictions of these two theories are identical.
Illuminating discussions are available in Kadmon (2001) and Beaver and Clark (2008).
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whose members are a property (a function) and an individual (an argument). This
analysis of focus is represented in (42)—repeated below.
(42) a. [MARY]f ate clams.
b. hkx:x ate clams; Maryi  k-abstracting on the focus
Given this analysis, recovering semantic content, viz. truth conditional content, is
straightforward, but it also provides a useful resource for explaining various effects.
For instance, semantic effects observed when focused elements interact with focus-
sensitive particles and pragmatic effects such as question-answer congruence.
A common observation in the study of focus is that focus restricts the set of
contexts in which sentences can be felicitously asserted. The paradigm example of
this effect is question-answer pairs. The general observation is that focus-marked
sentences asserted in response to wh-questions are felicitous only if the focus-
marked constituent is correlated with the wh-phrase of the particular question.22 For
example, consider the question (46) and each response in (46a–46c). Observe that
responses where the focus-marked constituent is not correlated with the wh-phrase
are infelicitous.
(46) What did Mary eat?
a. Mary ate [CLAMS]f.
b. *Mary [ATE]f clams.
c. *[MARY]f ate clams
A useful way of thinking about the constraints on assertion induced by focus is that
focus constrains the questions that the sentence can felicitously answer. The
Structured Meanings analysis provide a straightforward explanation of these
restrictions on use. Since focus-induced interpretations are derived by lambda-
abstracting on the focus-marked constituents, this procedure provides a method for
determining which questions the focus-marked sentence is most naturally under-
stood as purporting to answer. It can only felicitously answer questions with a
denotation that corresponds to the function obtained from abstraction on the focus,
cf. (45b).
4.2 Focus and non-referring definites
The close correlation between questions and focus provides a simple and intuitive
explanation of the changes in truth value intuitions noted in the beginning—cf.
(30–32). The explanation is that focus-marking fixes the questions that the sentence
can felicitously answer. With no focus-marked constituents, (30–32) could serve as
felicitous answers to different questions, but the result of focusing the DPs in
(30–32) is that these sentences are now most naturally interpreted as providing an
answer to a specific question.
22 Cf. Rooth (1996), Krifka (2001), and Kadmon (2001) for discussion.
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(47) a. [The king of FRANCE]f is bald.
b. hkx:x is bald; the king of Francei  k-abstracting on the focus
c. kx:x is bald  derived function
d. Who is bald?  the relevant question
(48) a. [The king of FRANCE]f owns a pen.
b. hkx:x owns a pen; the king of Francei  k-abstracting on the focus
c. kx:x owns a pen  derived function
d. Who owns a pen?  the relevant question
(49) a. [The king of FRANCE]f always enjoys a
croissant in the morning.
b. hkx:x always enjoys a croissant in the
morning; the king of Francei
 k-abstracting on
the focus
c. kx:x always enjoys a croissant
in the morning
 derived function
d. Who always enjoyes a croissant in the morning?  the relevant
question
k-abstraction on the focus yields an ordered sequence, a function and an argument.
The derived function is the denotation of a question, namely the denotation of a wh-
question where we’ve k-abstracted on the wh-phrase. Hence, we’ve obtained a
simple method for determining which question these sentences are most naturally
interpreted as answering.
(30–32) elicit intuitions of falsity and given the analysis above this is also pre-
dicted by the FIH. The (a) condition is satisfied, because (30–32) are most easily
interpreted as responses to particular questions and therefore as consonant con-
versational moves. The (b) condition is satisfied, because the questions against
which each of these sentences are evaluated have true answers (cf. the questions
above). The prediction of the hypothesis is therefore that these sentences should
elicit immediate intuitions of falsity and I believe the data verifies this prediction.
The hypothesis that there is a systematic connection between robust intuitions of
falsity and consonant conversational moves, i.e. putative answers to QUDs, is thus
supported by the cases involving focus. But, in order to evaluate in more detail the
predictions of the present hypothesis, it’s instructive to consider what happens if we
change focus-structure in (30–32). Interestingly, it seems that the result of focusing
constituents outside the non-referring DP is again a change in intuitions. In par-
ticular, I find that there is a clear contrast between (30–32) and (50–52).
(50) #The king of France is [BALD]f
(51) #The king of France owns [a PEN]f
(52) #The king of France always enjoys [a CROISSANT]f in the morning.
Descriptions, truth value intuitions, and questions 607
123
pe
er
-0
05
77
97
0,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
8 
M
ar
 2
01
1
These cases seem to me to elicit a sense of squeamishness rather than falsity. Out of
context assertions of (50–52) are distinctly odd rather than obviously false. But why
is there this marked difference in intuitions when the focus-marking is changed from
the non-referring subject DP to a constituent in the VP? Let’s again analyze these
constructions.
(53) a. The king of France is [BALD]f.
b. hkR: The king of France is R; baldi  k-abstracting on the focus
c. kR: The king of France is R  derived function
d. The king of France is what?
(what is the king of France like?)
 the relevant question
(54) a. The king of France owns [a PEN]f.
b. hkP: The king of France owns P; a peni  k-abstracting on the
focus
c. kP: The king of France owns P  derived function
d. The king of France owns what?
(what does the king of France own?)
 the relevant question
(55) a. The king of France owns always
enjoys [a CROISSANT]f
in the morning.
b. hkP: The king of France always enjoys
P in the morning; a croissanti
 k-abstracting on the
focus
c. kP: The king of France always
enjoys P in the morning:
 derived function
d. The king of France always enjoys
what in the morning?
(what does the king of France always
enjoy in the morning?)
 the relevant question
Given this analysis, it’s unsurprising that these sentences elicit squeamishness when
constituents outside the non-referring DP are focus-marked, because this produces a
different question-answer structure. The sentences in (50–52) are most naturally
interpreted as answering different questions than the sentences in (30–32), namely
questions which lack true answers. Absent heavy duty contextual assumptions, there
are no true answers to a question about what a non-existing entity is like and a
discourse revolving around a QUD which has no true answers is a defective dis-
course. As a result, these sentences are most naturally interpreted as consonant
answers in a defective discourse. This result is consistent with the FIH. The sen-
tences (53–55) satisfy the (a) condition, because despite the fact that the relevant
questions have no true answers these sentences are naturally interpreted as conso-
nant conversational moves. However, since the relevant questions have no true
answers, (53–55) fail to satisfy the (b) condition. Again, this supports the hypothesis
that falsity intuitions are a result of evaluating sentences with respect to
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QUDs—namely QUDs which have true answers (or are not known to have no true
answers).23
5 Extending the proposal
5.1 Complex constructions and intensional interpretations
The problem of conflicting truth value intuitions, as ordinarily conceived, concerns
a puzzling and apparently non-systematic distribution of truth value judgments. In
short, the problem is explaining why some SWEPFs elicit judgments of falsity while
others elicit a sense of squeamishness. However, if complex/intensional cases are
taken into consideration, this distribution appears to break down. In particular, it
seems that complex/intensional SWEPFs often give rise to robust judgments of
truth. Consider for example (56).
(56) Who does Mary fear?
a. Mary fears the king of France.
If Mary believes that there is a king of France and also fears the king of France, it
seems that (56a) is true. It also seems that an adequate semantic analysis should be
able to predict this. However, the truth of (56a) clearly depends on an intensional
interpretation of the sentence. (56a) cannot be judged true unless it’s assumed that
Mary believes in the existence of a French king. In contrast, suppose it’s common
ground that Mary knows that there is no king of France. In this case, i.e. where (56a)
is interpreted extensionally, I think there’s a natural inclination to judge (56a) false.
And this is what the FIH predicts.
In other words, explaining truth value intuitions as regards complex/intensional
cases is a quite different project than explaining truth value intuitions as regards
non-complex/extensional cases. First, the distribution of intuitions is, for various
reasons, entirely different in the complex cases. Secondly, it’s widely agreed that a
proper semantic analysis of complex constructions requires a more general dis-
cussion of the semantics of modals, i.e. epistemic and root modals, attitude verbs,
if-clauses, but also the full range of logical connectives. This is obviously a rather
daunting task. I therefore think that it’s quite reasonable to assume that complex
cases, and in particular intensional cases, should be set aside. There are good
23 One potential problem for the account sketched here is multiple focus constructions, where one of the
focused constituents is a non-referring DP. While I’m not confident that the data from such cases is
entirely stable, it seems that these elicit falsity judgments less frequently. A similar problem arises for
discourse contexts with multiple constituent questions, viz. questions which contain two wh-phrases such
as ‘who ate what?’. Multiple constituent questions and multiple focus constructions are already a point of
controversy in the literature on the semantics and pragmatics of focus, cf. e.g. Krifka (1991, 2001), so
how to resolve these potential problems is a delicate issue. An in-depth discussion would require at least a
serious study of the relevant data and plausibly a more detailed and more complex story about prosody,
focus-distribution, and question-answer congruence. The aim of this paper is to provide a fairly pro-
grammatic account of the relation between truth value intuitions and context, so I eschew a discussion of
these potential problems here.
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reasons to believe that intuitions about such cases must be explained along quite
different lines and involve a range of considerations which are not relevant in non-
complex/extensional cases.24 This, I take it, is also the reason that complex/
intensional cases are rarely discussed in the literature on the present problem. So,
while (56a) is a putative counter-example to the FIH (i.e. both conditions of the FIH
are satisfied, yet one reading of the sentence fails to elicit a sense of falsity), it is a
counter-example only on an intensional reading. However the FIH should be
understood as a hypothesis which aims to explain a particular distribution of intu-
itions about non-complex/extensional cases—not complex/intensional cases.
Now, having set complex/intensional cases aside, one might nevertheless worry
whether my proposal is extendable to SWEPFs evaluated as asserted abruptly and
out of context. The prima facie problem is that an explanation of such non-con-
textualized SWEPFs appears to preclude appeals to discourse contexts or QUDs. In
the next sections, I therefore provide a rough sketch of an explanation of how non-
contextualized cases can be assimilated to the present proposal.25
5.2 Out-of-context SWEPFs
The notion of evaluating sentences as asserted abruptly and out of context is fre-
quently used in the literature, but it should be agreed that assertions cannot occur out
of context. Any assertion, real or imagined, must occur against the background of
some contextual assumptions. This much is uncontroversial. But for that very
reason, it’s hard to believe that we are capable, in any substantial sense, of evalu-
ating SWEPFs as asserted abruptly and out of context. The question then is what
process is invoked and against what contextual assumptions we are evaluating the
sentences. A plausible answer is that we evaluate the sentence by trying to deter-
mine which question an assertion of the sentence is intended to address. If so, an
explanation of the distribution of intuitions as regards non-contextualized cases is
that if it’s determined that the assertion is intended to address a question which is
known to have no true answer, it elicits a sense of squeamishness. Similarly, if it
cannot be determined which question the assertion is intended to address or the
question cannot be answered, this also gives rise to a sense of squeamishness. In
contrast, one might think that SWEPFs elicit an intuition of falsity when it’s
determined and interpreted as an intended answer to a question which is not known
24 For example, a presuppositional analysis should not predict truth value gaps for every complex
sentence containing a non-denoting definite, i.e. when embedded in modal constructions, conjunctions,
conditionals etc. It’s standardly assumed that an adequate account of presupposition projection is what’s
required to avoid this consequence and the current literature contains numerous attempts to provide such
an account. In contrast, while a standard Russellian analysis of definites is capable of computing classical
truth values for definites embedded in complex constructions, this requires a range of not unproblematic
assumptions about scopal ambiguities, see e.g. Fodor (1970), and Ba¨uerle (1983). For related problems
with an existential analysis and modal verbs see Heim (1991), Elbourne (2005, 2009), and Schoubye
(2010).
25 I should emphasize that the aforementioned accommodation theories are not obviously inconsistent
with my proposal. While I’ve argued that these theories suffer from certain inadequacies, one could,
I believe, combine my analysis with e.g. von Fintel’s (2004) analysis of non-contextualized cases. From
the point of view of theoretical parsimony, a uniform account is obviously desirable, but it’s perfectly
conceivable that different explanations are required in order to account for the full range of data.
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to have no true answers. The conjecture is thus that these robust intuitions also result
from evaluating the SWEPF against a particular question—a question which the
evaluator for various reasons interprets the sentence as addressing. What requires
explaining is how relevant questions are identified and how evaluators select among
them. Below I provide a rough sketch of an answer to this question.
5.3 Discourse topics and practical relevance
Successful discourse comprehension depends crucially on determining what infor-
mation an assertion is intended to convey—e.g. what question an assertion is in-
tended to address. One particularly important interpretative task is therefore
determining the topic of discussion. In simple subject-predicate constructions, one
might think that absent contextual information there is a natural inclination to
interpret the grammatical subject of a sentence as the topic where topic is under-
stood as the topic of the discourse or a question under discussion. While topics in
the sense of particular syntactic constituents, i.e. grammatical subjects, and topics in
the sense of QUDs must not be conflated (cf. Roberts 2009), it’s not implausible that
these are conflated in discourse interpretation when no information about the dis-
course context is supplied. This fact helps explain a particular pattern of truth value
intuitions which was observed by Strawson, namely that when a non-denoting DP
occurs in a sentence as the grammatical subject, the sentence is liable to elicit a
sense of squeamishness. In contrast, when a non-denoting DP occurs as grammatical
object (or as a prepositional object), the sentence is liable to elicit an intuition of
falsity. Indeed, it’s actually somewhat difficult to find examples of sentences with
non-denoting DPs in object position which elicit a sense of squeamishness. This
contrast is captured in Strawson’s famous examples (57–58) and this furnished the
grounds for Strawson’s proposed analysis.
(57) # The king of France visited the Exhibition. (Strawson 1964)
(58) F The Exhibition was visited by the king of France.
If Strawson’s observation about these cases is correct, it provides an explanation of
a range of non-contextualized SWEPFs which is consistent with the FIH. If the
grammatical subjects are interpreted as topical, i.e. as the topic of discussion, these
DPs are naturally interpreted to be part of the question that is being addressed. In
other words, the non-denoting DPs are treated as given. This means that a sentence
such as (57) is naturally interpreted as addressing a question about the king of
France whereas (58) is naturally interpreted as addressing a question about the
exhibition. This provides a straightforward explanation of the distribution of intu-
itions which is consistent, indeed predicted, by the FIH.
While this explanation helps explain a range of cases, it’s insufficiently general.
We’ve already encountered a variety of SWEPFs with non-denoting DP subjects
which nevertheless elicit intuitions of falsity. This is one of the reasons that
Strawson’s proposed analysis fails. However, Strawson’s comments on the observed
contrast are quite illuminating.
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We might, for example, have felt a shade more squeamish if we had written
‘The king of France visited the Exhibition yesterday’ instead of ’The Exhi-
bition was visited yesterday by the king of France’. We feel very squeamish
indeed about ‘The king of France is bald’ presented abruptly, out of context,
just because we don’t naturally and immediately think of a context in which
interest is centred, say, on the question What bald notables are there? rather
than on the question What is the king of France like? or Is the king of France
bald? Of course, to either of these two questions the statement would not be
just an incorrect answer. These questions have no correct answer. (Strawson
1964, pp. 68–69)
Strawson raises an interesting question, namely how interest is centered in
sentence evaluations. While there might be a natural inclination to interpret
grammatical subjects as topical, i.e. as subjects under discussion, it’s possible
that this natural inclination is sometimes overridden, for example when certain
constituents are prosodically focused. Another factor which could plausibly im-
pact how interests are centered on specific questions is practical relevance. For
example, it seems quite likely that evaluators are liable to interpret sentences as
addressing a specific question if that question is somehow pertinent to their
interests. For example, consider the SWEPFs below which seem to elicit intu-
itions of falsity even when evaluated without any information about the
discourse context.
(59) F The king of France hates your mother.
(60) F The king of France is planning to bomb your city.
These sentences could felicitously answer a wide range of questions, but absent
contextual information, these would be most naturally interpreted as responses to
one of the two questions in (61) and (62) respectively.
(61) a. Who hates your mother?
b. Who does the king of France hate?
(62) a. Who is planning to bomb your city?
b. What is the king of France planning to bomb?
The hypothesis here is that speakers engaged in discourse interpretation select
among immediately available questions with a default to interpreting grammatical
subjects as topical. If nothing prompts selecting a particular question, the gram-
matical subject is assumed to be the topic of discussion. However, if one of the
available questions is practically relevant to the evaluator and is assumed to have
true answers, the evaluator’s interest is centered on that question and the default
interpretation of the grammatical subject as topical can thereby be overridden. If so,
the sentence is interpreted as addressing that question, rather than the other available
question. For example, if (59) triggers the questions in (61), the question (61a) has a
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clear practical relevance to most people, viz. most people have an interest in the
answer to that question. In contrast, the question in (61b) has no practical relevance
to most people. If this is right, evaluators should normally select the (a) questions
rather than the (b) questions which are known to have no true answers. And if that’s
the case, then (59) and (60) should both elicit intuitions of falsity—which they do.
This line of reasoning should then also explain why an out-of-context assertion of a
SWEPF such as (2) elicits squeamishness; both questions triggered by a sentence
such as (2) are practically irrelevant, and as a result evaluators default to an
interpretation on which the non-denoting DP is topical. This yields a prediction
consistent with the FIH. However, for this idea to work, practical relevance must be
construed quite broadly. For example, if a putative answer to a question would be
controversial or out of the ordinary, this is sufficient for it to be practically relevant.
A good analogy here is the process of presupposition accommodation. It’s fairly
well established that speakers often refuse to accommodate presuppositions if the
presupposed contents are controversial or out of the ordinary. I believe that
something quite similar is going on in the cases under consideration here. If an
assertion is interpreted as providing an answer to a question where the answer would
be controversial or out of the ordinary, speakers are liable to center their interest on
that particular question. This would for example explain the contrast between (2)
and (3–4) and also why there is a contrast in intuitions between the two sentences
below.
(63) a. #The king of France lives in castle.
b. FThe king of France lives in a spaceship.
I acknowledge that this explanation amounts, at best, to a very rough sketch of a
general strategy for explaining non-contextualized cases. To carry real weight, the
notion of practical relevance must explicated in much more detail and even then a
number of additional psychological and pragmatic factors must be taken into
consideration. However, it would be no surprise if explaining and determining
how interest is centered in discourse interpretation turns out to be exceedingly
complex. It’s beyond any reasonable doubt that informational contents play a very
important role in the generation of truth value intuitions, so a complete story
about interest-centering must in all likelihood include an account of the relation
between informational contents and speaker’s interests, desires, intentions and so
on. In other words, the really complicated step in analyzing these recalcitrant non-
contextualized cases is to explain why, and predict when, evaluators select
particular questions. The very rough explanation above is merely a crude example
intended to convince you that psychological factors could play a potentially
crucial role. If nothing else, one might think that the extremely complex behavior
of non-contextualized SWEPFs is a good reason not to rely on such cases in our
semantic theorizing. Thus, what I’m advocating is a methodological switch to
contextualized cases, since these are more stable and more easily explained. To
rely solely on non-contextualized cases requires that a satisfactory theory of
interest-centering is available.
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6 Existential versus. presuppositional analyses
I stated in the introduction that the present proposal provides prima facie support for
a presuppositional analysis of definites. The reason is that if my proposed analysis is
correct, i.e. if intuitions of falsity are the result of a particular relation of conver-
sational pertinence obtaining between speech acts, their contents, and QUDs, this
seems to support the conclusion that falsity intuitions are a result of factors which
look prima facie irrelevant to semantics. In particular, the fact that a sentence elicits
an intuition of falsity when its expressed content relates in a suitable way to a QUD
seems to reveal nothing significant about the semantic status of that sentence, e.g. its
truth value. This puts some pressure on an analysis which maintains that these
sentences should be assigned classical truth values. In particular, proponents of such
an analysis must explain why these intuitions really are semantically relevant de-
spite the fact that they seem to track various pragmatic factors.
In response, proponents of a Russellian analysis might be tempted to adopt the
present proposal and argue that squeamishness occurs because the contents of the
relevant sentences fail to relate to a QUD—the failure of conversational pertinence
simply is the reason that some SWEPFs elicit squeamishness. In other words, the
Russellian might attempt to adopt the present proposal only with the order of
explanation reversed. Here it should be noted that this strategy is not immediately
feasible. My analysis supplies only a sufficient condition for determining when
SWEFPs elicit falsity judgments, not a necessary condition and if the explanation is
to work in the opposite direction, i.e if we are to explain the squeamishness intuitions
in general, a necessary condition is needed. Of course, this is essentially a short-
coming of my proposal since determining both necessary and sufficient conditions is
desirable for independent reasons. Nevertheless, it’s important to emphasize that
such a necessary condition must be established if the Russellian is to employ the
present proposal as an explanation of the variance in truth value intuitions. Yet, even
if a necessary condition is determined, there remains a couple of issues for the
Russellian to address. For example, if falsity judgments track the semantic status of
these sentences, why is there such an intimate relation between conversational per-
tinence and truth value intuitions. On the present proposal, robust intuitions of falsity
are inherently related to the thoroughly pragmatic notion of consonance, but we
should not expect such pragmatic factors to influence intuitions which do track the
semantic status of the sentences. If these are genuine semantic intuitions, why are
they so closely correlated with the satisfaction of various pragmatic conditions.
Secondly, it seems that if conversational pertinence plays as crucial a role, as I’ve
suggested here, we should expect squeamishness to occur much more often. But if
we’re engaged in a discussion about, say, who won the Super Bowl, and I assert (64),
this assertion appears to elicit no immediate squeamishness as regards its truth value.
(64) Barack Obama is a Russian astronaut.
This assertion is inconsonant, indeed inappropriate, but I nevertheless think that
there is no immediate hesitation to judge it false. However, if the Russellian is right
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that the simple lack of conversational pertinence is what causes squeamishness
intuitions, squeamishness should occur for a whole range of sentences when these
are inconsonantly asserted in discourse. It seems somewhat questionable whether
there is such a general effect.
A presuppositional analysis of definites typically analyzes definite determiners as
partial functions, which are defined only for a subset of the domain of he,ti-func-
tions. If squeamishness tracks semantic defectiveness, it seems quite appropriate to
capture this in a semantic analysis in terms of an undefined function. I therefore take
it that the presuppositional analysis of SWEPFs has a prima facie, but non-trivial,
empirical advantage over an existential analysis.
7 Concluding remarks
The problem of conflicting truth value intuitions is often dismissed as intractable,
unimportant, and as a result uninteresting, see e.g. Geurts (1999, pp. 29–30). Here
I’ve attempted to demonstrate that this problem is important, that it’s not intractable,
and that it is interesting. I have focused exclusively on the definite determiner, but it
would ultimately be desirable to extend the proposed analysis here to the full range
of putatively presuppositional DPs and perhaps to presuppositional expressions in
general. Since incorporating other determiners into the present analysis would al-
most surely introduce a number of additional complexities, I’ve focused on pro-
viding a concrete and immediately plausible proposal for understanding the relation
between truth value intuitions and non-referring definites. I’ve argued that falsity
intuitions are the result of a particular interpretational mechanism; robust intuitions
arise when SWEPFs are evaluated in relation to QUDs and judging a SWEPF false
is therefore equivalent to (tacitly) recognizing that the SWEPF is an intended, but
not true, answer to the relevant QUD. In other words, judgments of falsity track
whether a SWEPF is a member of a set of true answers. The behavior of contex-
tualized SWEPFs seem to conform to this explanation and I’ve gestured towards a
similar explanation of non-contextualized SWEPFs as well. Given the available
data, I’ve advocated a methodological switch, but assuming that the data from non-
contextualized cases is relevant, the remaining key problem is determining how, in
the non-contextualized cases, speakers select particular questions. In conclusion,
much work remains to be done, but hopefully the proposal here can serve as a
general explanatory strategy.
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